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Executive Summary 
 
Build an automatic system for detecting atypical behavior within a health care 
application.  The development will consist of the following steps: 
 
1) Preprocess log files 
Take the raw TXT log files generated from a medical application and convert 
them to a format usable by a classification tool (WEKA1).   
• Reformat the data so that it adheres to structure required by classifier. 
• The application’s log files are event based.  Will reconstitute data so that 
it is properly organized for a given data run.  For example, data might be 
manipulated so that it shows activity per doctor for a 24 hour period – 
number of patients seen, number of workstations signed into, etc. 
• Data will be added to help in classification.  For example, information 
will be added that show the user’s job: physician, nurse, biller, etc. 
2) Classify 
Run the processed log files through the classification engine. 
• Will use WEKA to run through a variety of classification models and 
determine model and configuration that produces optimal results. 
• Will attempt to classify various ‘slices’ of data to see which produce the 
best results.  For example, we will compare the classification of user 
group nurses to the classification of pharmacists. 
• System alerts will be actionable items – in that a nurse that doesn’t act 
like other nurses should be investigated. 
 
3) Tune 
Build process to filter out data that should be ignored. 
• Allow for marking of ‘false positive’ or ‘false negative’ alerts.  
Specifically, if an instance is validated as a misclassification, we will 
remove it from dataset in order to achieve better classification (once 
classification is rerun).   
 
4) Report 
Produce meaningful reports supporting the investigation as to whether alert is 
appropriate. 
• Generate usable data to support investigation of the misclassified 
instances. 
 
                                                 
1
 http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/ 
Page 4  
1. Introduction 
Health care informatics is growing at an incredible pace.  Originally health care 
organizations, like all other industries, used pen and paper to track medical 
information.  Ten years ago the more mature health care organizations had 
simply practice management applications.  Today these organizations have full 
blown electronic health records systems.  Tomorrow these organizations will be 
sharing information across the globe. 
 
Physicians (and the sponsoring organizations) are obligated to protect this data.  
Health care has followed the trend of many other industries in implementing 
technologies and processes to address certain risks.  Encryption is enabled to 
ensure confidentiality.  Business continuity techniques are applied to ensure 
system availability.  However there is no ‘best practice’ solution that can be 
applied to the problem of detecting inappropriate activity.  How can a hospital 
tell when Nurse Smith is ‘snooping’ in medical records?  How can a radiologist 
tell when a lab technician is feeding information to a law firm? 
 
This paper will describe the efforts to design, build, and run a system that will 
detect atypical behavior in a health care application and see if that behavior is 
indicative of inappropriate activity.  The first section will discuss the impetus 
for such a system.  The second section will describe the design and 
implementation of this system.  The third section will document a series of 
experiments showing the accuracy of such a system in detecting inappropriate 
activity. 
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2. Background 
 
“What I may see or hear in the course of treatment or even outside of the treatment in 
regard to the life of men, which on no account one must spread abroad, I will keep 
myself holding such things shameful to be spoken about.2” 
 
Physicians and health care organizations are privy to a large amount of private 
information.  As custodians of this data they are obligated to ensure its privacy 
and security.  In the days of paper records this was a manageable exercise with 
minimal risk.  Physical locks kept people away from records.   
 
But with the advent of electronic medical records the landscape has changed.  In 
a large modern health care system, the intensive care unit will share the same 
data store as behavioral health (though hopefully with different access rights).  
Records are extremely easy to copy and move.  Overlay this with the enormous 
complexity of modern health care business, for example with employees, 
contractors, students, job sharing, outsourcing, and the mobile workforce.  
Ensuring the privacy of medical information is an extremely difficult task.  
Guaranteeing privacy is impossible. 
 
Luckily information security community has reached the level of maturity 
where people understand that security and privacy might never be guaranteed.  
Organizations generally strive for reasonable security by means of policies, 
auditing and access control, but complement this with other reactive controls.  A 
common safeguard used for this is auditing.  This will lead to “reasonable and 
appropriate3” controls to enforce security with the ability to look and see these 
were circumvented or misused. 
 
Most modern health care applications provide robust auditing.  However there is 
no easy way to detect inappropriate activity using static rules.  Consider the 
following scenarios: 
 
• Is it inappropriate that Nurse Smith looked at 20 patients? 
• Is it inappropriate that Nurse Smith printed 50 documents? 
• Is it inappropriate that Nurse Smith signed on to 10 workstations? 
 
Due to the variable nature of healthcare workflows, these may be appropriate or 
they may not.    But what if it were possible to compare Nurse Smith’s activity 
to that of other nurses?  If Nurse Smith’s activity was significantly different 
than his peers then this might warrant review.  
                                                 
2
 Hippocratic Oath 
3
 This language is directly pulled from the HIPAA security ruleset. 
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3. Impetus 
3.1 HIPAA 
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) was signed 
into law by President Clinton in 1996.  The law was intended to address some 
major shortcoming in the current health insurance arena.  The legislation 
specifically “provides for improved access, portability, continuity, and 
renewability of employment-related group health plans. The act also addresses 
health insurance fraud and abuse, promotes the use of medical savings accounts, 
improves access to long-term care insurance coverage, and simplifies and 
coordinates Medicare benefits.4” 
 
The HIPAA legislation consists of five titles.  Title one, ‘Health Insurance 
Reform’, was meant to protect employees who switch jobs by mandating 
continued coverage to ensure there was no gap in coverage.5  A gap in coverage 
would then allow insurance companies to deny coverage of preexisting 
conditions.  Insurance companies were now forced to accept consumers who 
were covered under a previous plan without consideration of pre-existing 
conditions. 
 
Title two, ‘Administrative Simplification’, mandated standards by which 
various insurance functions could be done electronically.    By driving the 
industry to electronic transactions, the law hoped to lessen “administrative 
burden, lower operating costs, and improve overall data quality6”.   The most 
significant of these provisions is under the Administrative Simplification from 
which the privacy and security standards derive. 
 
The remaining three titles, ‘Tax Related Health Provisions’, ‘Application and 
Enforcement of Group Health Plan Requirements’, and ‘Revenue Offsets’ make 
up the remainder of the law. 
3.2 Administrative Simplification 
In passing HIPAA, the federal government tasked the Department of Health and 
Human Services with adopting standards in support of the law.  Their first 
objective was to encourage the use of electronic transactions for various health 
care functions.  To that effect, DHHS adopted standards to drive this initiative.  
On August 17, 2000 the final rule on ‘Standard for Electronic Transaction and 
Code Set7’ was published (65 FR 50312).  In it were references to dozens of 
detailed rule sets that had been defined by various industry groups.  DHHS did 
not in fact design data structures or protocols, but rather worked with the health 
insurance industry to choose the best among the competing rule sets.  
                                                 
4
 http://www.amcp.org/data/jmcp/vol5/num2/niecko.html 
5
 http://www.cms.gov/HealthInsReformforConsume/02_WhatHIPAADoesandDoesNotDo.asp 
6
 http://aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/final/txfinal.pdf 
7
 http://aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/final/txfinal.pdf 
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HIPAA was creating an infrastructure by which health insurance companies and 
entities they deal with could easily send information back and forth.  When 
compared with paper-based processes, electronic transactions would 
undoubtedly be quicker and cheaper.  Hospitals would now have the ability to 
check real-time if an insurance card was valid, what the subscriber’s co-pay 
was, and what benefits were covered under the patient’s plan. 
 
However with the ease by which this information can move, law makers 
realized that the public would have concerns about the use and misuse of their 
information.  Could a pharmaceutical company use this information to target 
potential customers?  Could psychiatric notes be used in a child custody case?  
Law makers had to include guidelines for the use and protection of this 
information.  To that end, the Administrative Simplification section of HIPAA 
required the creation of standards for both data privacy and security5. The 
former ensures that protected information is only used in ways authorized by the 
law, while the later sets rules by which health care organizations must protect 
the data. 
 
3.2.1 Security Standard 
Realizing that health care organizations would be accumulating a mass of data 
that must be protected from misuse, the Department of Health and Human 
Services was tasked with creating the Security Standard.  In April 2003, HHS 
published its final ‘Security Standards’ document with the intent to “establish a 
minimum standard for security of electronic health information8”. 
 
The standards lay out a couple of dozen requirements for health care 
organizations.  For example they are required to have a termination policy to 
ensure that accounts are disabled as soon as possible after an employee leaves 
the company.  Another requirement is that companies must have a disaster 
recovery plan to ensure timely resumption of services after a disaster. 
 
The security standards also require that companies have security incident 
procedures.  Specifically they are required to implement policies and procedures 
to “identify and respond to suspected or known security incidents; mitigate, to 
the extent practical, harmful effects of security incidents that are known to the 
covered entity; and document security incidents and their outcomes.9” 
 
The standard goes on to define a security incidents as follows: “the attempted or 
successful unauthorized access, use, disclosure, modification, or destruction of 
information or interference with system operations in an information system10”. 
 
                                                 
8
 45 CFR 164 Subpart C  “Guiding Principles for Standard Selection” 
9
 45 CFR §164.308  
10
 45 CFR §164.308 
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This is a difficult standard to meet because it requires organizations to detect 
when someone successfully accesses medical data that he shouldn’t.  On the 
surface this appears to be straight forward – boiling down to a simple question – 
“Is Nurse Smith authorized to look at patient Jones’ information”?  In the 
complex world of medical entities with convoluted relationships as well as 
poorly defined roles, this is an extremely difficult question to answer.  In a large 
hospital where data is accessed thousands of times by a myriad people, devices 
and locations each and every day, this would need to be automated.  How could 
a computer tell appropriate versus inappropriate access? 
 
There is no good answer to this question.  Luckily for health care organizations, 
HIPAA was considered a toothless law. 11  The standard had no requirement for 
external reporting, and enforcement was only complaint-based.  This meant that 
the data leak had to been traceable back to the health care organization – which 
is extremely difficult in most cases.   
 
In fact 2010, a full six years after HIPAA Privacy rule set went into effect, was 
the first time a person was sentenced to prison for violation of this law.  There 
were only a handful of other prosecutions resulting in minimal fines.  For the 
time being, there was little reason for organizations to struggle with this 
problem. 
3.3 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act12 (ARRA) was passed in 2009 
in response the economic crisis.  It had the stated goals of job creation and 
spurring economic activity.  As part of this stimulus package, the bill makes 
billions of dollars available to drive adoption of health information technology 
within the industry.  Law makers also include language meant to address some 
of the short comings of the original HIPAA privacy and security rules. These 
provisions are included in a subtitle of ARRA called HITECH. 
3.3.1 Health Information Technology for Economic and 
Clinical Health Act13 
These provisions increased the impetus for health care organizations to look for 
and address inappropriate activity.   This was done in two ways.  First the act 
greatly increased the number of entities that needed to comply with HIPAA.  
Previously only health care provider, insurance companies and clearing houses 
had to comply with HIPAA requirements.  These entities are collectively known 
as covered entities.  Now companies that utilize protected health information on 
behalf of covered entities must also adhere to the HIPAA requirements.  This 
means that companies that provide billing services, call center services or 
                                                 
11
 http://law.vanderbilt.edu/publications/vanderbilt-law-review/archive/volume-60-number-1-january-
2007/download.aspx?id=2531 
12
 http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ005.pdf 
13
 http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/111/hitech.pdf 
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hundreds of other outsourced services for covered entities are now subject to the 
provisions of the original HIPAA law.    The number of entities that were 
required to comply with these rules grew exponentially overnight. 
 
The second way that HITECH changed how health care organizations dealt with 
inappropriate activity is that it put strict requirements on breach notification.  In 
cases were breaches were detected, HIPAA did not obligate organizations to 
notify affected users.   Health care organizations were free to notify the affected 
individual if they chose but were not strictly required to do so.  Under ARRA 
entities are obligated to make a series of notifications that were “made without 
unreasonable delay and in no case later than 60 calendar days after the 
discovery of a breach14”.    
 
In addition to mandating notifications in a timely fashion, the law set forth who 
needs to be notified.  Organizations that experienced a data breach must notify 
not only the affected person but also the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services for any sized breach.  Additionally if the incident included more than 
500 individuals, organizations must make “prominent media outlets” aware of 
the breach. 
 
ARRA now required organizations to deal with breaches in a timely fashion.  
Delayed responses can put the organization at odds with these laws.  ARRA has 
the teeth that HIPAA lacked.  Organizations now had to get serious about 
protecting health care information. 
3.4 Other Drivers  
HIPAA and ARRA have provisions to ensure that private health information is 
properly protected.  However that is not the only type of consumer data held by 
health care organizations.   For the purposes of managing patients’ records and 
accounts, a large amount of private data must be kept above and beyond health 
care information.  Each of these data types have their own set of mandates 
requiring organizations to look for inappropriate access. 
3.4.1 State Breach Laws 
Nearly all states have laws in place requiring business to notify consumers when 
their personal information has been misappropriated.15   Though these vary from 
state to state, they mostly have the same basic requirements.  Business that deal 
with private consumer data must notify affected individuals where their 
personal information has been misappropriated.   In the state of Illinois, 
personal information includes the patient’s name in combination with his social 
security number, driver’s license number or credit card number. 
 
                                                 
14
 http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/pdf/E9-20169.pdf  164.408 
15
 
http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/TelecommunicationsInformationTechnology/SecurityBreachNotificati
onLaws/tabid/13489/Default.aspx 
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Organizations with the ability to detect inappropriate activity and respond 
quickly to contain the situation might limit their liability in regards to this 
statute.   
3.4.2 PCI 
The Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council is an association of 
financial institutions interested in development and adoption of security 
standards for the protection of data accounts.  This group developed a robust set 
of standards, collectively known as Payment Card Industry Data Security 
Standards or PCI-DSS16, which set forth a proscriptive list of safeguards 
intended to protect these sorts of financial transactions.  All merchants that use 
credit cards are contractually obligated to comply with these rule sets.  Non-
compliance can result in fines and higher transactional fees.  In the worse cases, 
the organization may be prohibited from using credit cards. 
 
PCI-DSS requires logging of activity on systems that process cardholder or 
sensitive authentication data.  Additionally these logs must be reviewed 
regularly looking for the purpose of ‘preventing, detecting, or minimizing the 
impact of a data compromise’.   
3.4.3 Class Action Lawsuits 
There have been several attempts to file civil17 or class action18 lawsuits in 
response to breaches of private information.   As shown above, health care 
organizations are now required to publicize breaches of private data.  This will 
become more common as the number of data breaches will unlikely continue.   
 
To protect themselves from these lawsuits, health care organizations must show 
that they follow best practices in protection and monitoring of this private 
information.   
3.5 Summary 
Health care organizations are used to dealing with a plethora of regulations and 
compliance efforts in regards to accreditation, state and federal requirements 
and insurance mandates.  Protection of health care information is one more 
issue that will have to be dealt with.  The more successful these organizations 
become in detecting inappropriate activity, the better suited they will be to 
comply with these requirements.   
                                                 
16
 https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/security_standards/pci_dss.shtml 
17
 http://privacylaw.proskauer.com/tags/data-breach-litigation/ 
18
 http://www.networkworld.com/community/node/18598 
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4. Challenge 
With the obvious need to look for unauthorized access to protected information, 
why is this so difficult?  This appears to be a simple question of who needs to 
see what information.  However for a variety of reasons there is no easy answer 
to this question. 
 
The main issue is that medical entities have typically defaulted to open access 
instead of closed access.  This is due to the nature of the work being done.  In 
health care quick access to data is of paramount importance.  Imagine the case 
where a physician is prevented access to critical data in the middle of a 
procedure.  
 
There are also concerns about the efficiencies of physicians.  Any technology or 
process that is seen as impeding physician work will be viewed unfavorably by 
physicians.  Health care organizations are keenly aware of this and account for 
this when designing systems.  It would be unacceptable to have physicians call 
the help desk to get access to a patient’s information.   
 
The last factor is the complex web of relationships in health care.  This creates a 
very convoluted list of requirements that generally start from the basis that a 
physician has access to his patients in the system in which he works.  Physician 
staff derives rights to the same patients’ data based on their relationship to the 
physician. 
 
This is extremely difficult to implement effectively. 
• A medical coder will need access to most sensitive information 
regarding a client for billing purposes. 
• Outsource clinical services exist for reading of medical images. 
• Physicians may or may not be employed by a hospital. 
• Physicians may have relationships with multiple hospitals. 
• Nurses often need access to all information that their doctor can access. 
• Non-clinicians (such as dieticians) may need to access parts of the 
patient’s information. 
• Information on a given patient may exist in multiple locations such as in 
a hospital’s electronic medical record system (EMR), a practice’s 
practice management system (PMS) and in his personal health record 
(PHR). 
• Non-clinical services such as billing and transcription are often 
outsourced.  These companies will hold data from multiple physicians, 
labs and hospitals. 
• Radiologists are not directly associated with any patient but would need 
to access many records. 
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Now consider the case where Nurse Smith is snooping on his neighbor’s records 
at the hospital.  How can this be detected?  It is a very difficult situation that 
cannot be addressed via a simple rule-based analysis.   The biller looking at the 
most number of patients is not necessarily being malicious.  The pharmacist that 
looks at more than 25 patients is not necessarily being malicious.   A static, 
rule-based approach to detecting atypical behavior is not effective. 
 
Luckily this problem is not unique to health care informatics.  There is a whole 
branch of computer science called Machine Learning (ML) that designs tools to 
help machine automatically detect patterns and derive meaning from them.  In 
ML, the task of detecting atypical behavior can be done by building a 
classification model for typical behavior and identifying the misclassified 
behavior/items.  And there are several classification tools in ML.  These tools 
have been successfully applied to many real world problems, for instance: 
• Which emails is spam? 
• Is a patient better suited for hard or soft contacts? 
• Can species of plant be automatically identified based on attributes? 
 
The following describes a system that will attempt to use classification models 
to identify which users of this medical system are not acting like their peers.  
This will then allow anomaly detection to shift from rule-based reporting to a 
more heuristical model that flags abnormal events by comparing a user’s 
activity to that of others in the same role.   
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5. Data  
Data for this experiment was pulled from a medical application, McKesson 
Portal.  This system is the primary tool used to view data from dozens of 
medical systems.  Logs representing two months of activity (October and 
November 2009) were included.   The health care system from which these 
were pulled consisted of 9 hospitals and 15,000 employees. 
 
The system produces log files which record various activities.  To maintain 
HIPAA compliance, the system produces very detailed logs.  Below is a listing 
of events captured in the logs. 
• 100_SignIn – This event is logged when a user successfully 
authenticates to the application. 
• 100_SignOut – This event is logged when a user is signed out of the 
application.  This can be done by the user or as a result of automatic 
timeout. 
• 100_AutoSuspend – This event is logged when a user’s session is 
suspended after a set period of inactivity. 
• 100_LeaveSuspend – This event is logged when a user’s session is 
removed from a suspended state. 
• 100_ManualSuspend – This event is logged when a user chooses to 
suspend his session. 
• 100_ModuleAccess – This event is logged when a user accesses a new 
module within the application.  Modules are specific views to 
accomplish certain tasks such as patient lists, station census and 
transcription. 
• 100_ChangePatientContext – This event is logged when a user is 
granted access to a patient’s information.  Once granted access the user 
will be able to view that patient’s data. 
• 300_SignInError – This event is logged when an attempted signin fails. 
• 400_ModulePrint – This event is logged when a user uses the print 
function within the module.  
 
Two events make up the vast majority of logged events.  100_ModuleAccess 
accounts for 83% of the events and 100_ChangePatientContext accounts for 
12%.  100_SignIn and 100_SignOut make up another 3%.  No other event 
accounts for more than 1% of the events. 
 
The raw logs are written to simple text files and the data is XML-formatted.  
Below is an example of a typical entry19.  Some details vary based on the 
specific event.  For example a 100_SignIn event does not record a patient’s 
name. 
 
20091001:000221.190:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
                                                 
19
 Note that confidential information such as patient name was omitted in this example. 
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<AuditMessage xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" 
xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation="http://infosolutions.mckesson.com/audit/HL7auditmessagepayload.xsd"
> 
<EventIdentification EventActionCode="R" EventDateTime="20090930235536" 
EventID="100_ModuleAccess" EventOutcomeIndicator="0"> 
</EventIdentification> 
<UserIdentification RoleID="504" UserID="#USERNAME#"> 
</UserIdentification> 
<AuditSourceIdentification AuditSourceID="HorizonWP Physician Portal" AuditSourceType="3"> 
</AuditSourceIdentification> 
<NetworkAccessPointIdentification NetworkAccessPointID="#WORKSTATION#" 
NetworkAccessPointTypeCode="1"> 
</NetworkAccessPointIdentification> 
<NetworkAccessPointIdentification NetworkAccessPointID="#IPADDRESS#" 
NetworkAccessPointTypeCode="2"> 
</NetworkAccessPointIdentification> 
<ParticipantObjectIdentification ParticipantObjectDataLifeCycle="5" ParticipantObjectID="Announcement - 
Patient Search" ParticipantObjectITypeCode="12" ParticipantObjectTypeCode="2"> 
</ParticipantObjectIdentification> 
<ParticipantObjectIdentification ParticipantObjectDataLifeCycle="1" 
ParticipantObjectID="#MEDRECORD#" ParticipantObjectITypeCode="1" 
ParticipantObjectName="#PATIENTNAME# " ParticipantObjectTypeCode="1"> 
</ParticipantObjectIdentification> 
<ParticipantObjectIdentification ParticipantObjectDataLifeCycle="1" ParticipantObjectITypeCode="2" 
ParticipantObjectName="#PATIENTNAME# " ParticipantObjectTypeCode="1"> 
</ParticipantObjectIdentification> 
</AuditMessage> 
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6. System Components 
It was necessary to do a series of pre-processing to prepare the data for analysis.   
6.1 PreProcess.pl 
Each log entry represents a single transaction for a user.  For the purpose of 
analyzing user activity, it was necessary to consolidate data into periods of time.  
A single transaction of Dr Smith logging into the system is a poor data point.  
However by viewing all transactions for Dr Smith for a given day, this can be 
more readily compared and contrasted against other users of the system. 
• How many times this day did Dr Smith sign in? 
• How many patients were viewed by Dr Smith? 
• How many workstations did Dr Smith use this day? 
• How does this compare to other physicians? 
• How does this compare to nurses?  Or receptionist? Or other staff? 
 
The raw logs were processed into 24 hour blocks.  This means that for the 
purposes of classification, an instance is the cumulative activity for a user for a 
single day. 
 
There are three general types of data stored for each instance.  First there were 
many simple counts.  For example an instance shows the total number of 
patients seen by the user for that day. 
 
Secondly the system recorded aggregate information for an instance.  For 
example the system records the total number of unique patients accessed by the 
user over the course of the day.  This aggregate information can be significantly 
different from the simple totals.  A nurse in an intensive care unit (ICU) may 
work with only a dozen patients over the course of the day, but each time she 
changes context to another patient a 100_ChangePatientContext event is logged.  
So in a typical day, this ICU nurse may have worked with 10 patients looking at 
each patient’s records 5 times.  That would be recorded as 50 total patients but 
only 10 unique patients. 
 
Lastly, in addition to recording total and aggregate counts, other data was added 
regarding the user.  Specifically it was necessary to record supplemental 
information to help classify the user.  For example the raw log files record the 
user name, such as ASmith, but not necessarily the role.  To analyze activity 
from a role-based perspective, it was necessary to tell if ASmith is a physician, 
a nurse or something else.   
 
The source for role information came from the organization’s Windows AD 
system.  For each user found in the logs, the user account name was queried in 
Windows.  The user account description field was parsed looking for certain 
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text strings indicating the role.  The text strings were the bases for assigning a 
value to the data point called RoleAD.  
 
Note that the application does in fact record a RoleID attribute with each log 
entry.  This is intended to be used by the system administrators to document the 
role information for a given user account.  However, in this health care 
organization’s implementation, this field was not consistently used and was 
considered less reliable than Windows AD. 
 
The PreProcess script20 generates output21 written to a comma separated value 
(CSV) file. 
6.2 WekaDBManagement.pl 
The classification engine used (WEKA) is able to pull data from a variety of 
sources.  It would be able to pull data directly from the PreProcess data file.  
However it was desirous to be able to initiate classification runs on various 
views of the data without having to reprocess the log files.  
 
To achieve this the PreProcess output needed to be imported in a database.  
Then by the use of SQL calls, the necessary flexibility was achieved.  So instead 
of being restricted to considering the whole data set, it was possible to slice the 
data in many different ways. 
• Look at all sites together, any single site, or a combination thereof. 
• Dynamically change the class being classified.  That allowed, for 
example, the analysis of physician’s activity followed by the analysis of 
pharmacists'. 
• Look at different date ranges. 
• Provided ability to ignore certain instances or users. 
 
The PreProcess output was imported into the database by means of the 
WekaDBManagement script.  This populated two different tables: instances and 
users.  The instances table contains the relevant information on the various 
instances.  While this table was being populated, the user information was 
reviewed and added to the users table.  In addition to a single entry for each 
user, summary information over the entire 60 day dataset was collected such as 
the average number of logins and the average number of patients.  This 
summary information is intended to provide a view into the user’s typical 
behavior. 
 
Additionally the system flagged cases where there were changes to the user 
information.  For example the system would flag cases where the user signed 
into workstations at more than one location.  These are written to the events 
table. 
                                                 
20
 The PreProcess script can be found in the supporting documents. 
21
 The PreProcess output file can be found in the supporting documents. 
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6.3 MCInfo.pl 
For the purposes of easily retrieving information needed for analysis, a script 
was written which pulled relevant information from the raw log files.  The script 
pulls information from ARFF files (WEKA output) and prompts the user to 
provide details necessary to narrow down the request. 
• FileName:  Path and filename of ARFF file 
• Analysis Type: Instance will report on single instance.  Classification 
will report on entire leaf.  User will pull up all instances associated with 
that particular user. 
 
The script will prompt the user for information based on the type of analysis 
requested.  At the end of each request, the raw log files will be presented 
allowing the analyst to see the detailed activity. 
6.4 Database 
The database holds all information regarding instances, users and any tuning 
efforts.  It consists of three tables: instances, users, and events. 
6.4.1 Instance Table 
The instances table holds the individual instances derived from the application 
logs.  The table is populated by the WekaDBManagement script. 
 
CREATE TABLE  `weka`.`instances` ( 
  `User` varchar(20) NOT NULL, 
  `LogFile` int(11) NOT NULL, 
  `Logins` int(10) NOT NULL, 
  `Hours` int(10) NOT NULL, 
  `LogOuts` int(10) NOT NULL, 
  `Suspends` int(10) NOT NULL, 
  `ModulesUnique` int(10) NOT NULL, 
  `ModulesTotal` int(10) NOT NULL, 
  `PatientsUnique` int(10) NOT NULL, 
  `PatientsTotal` int(10) NOT NULL, 
  `APWW` int(10) NOT NULL, 
  `PrintModule` int(10) NOT NULL, 
  `WorkstationsUnique` int(10) NOT NULL, 
  `IgnoreInstance` int(10) NOT NULL DEFAULT '0') 
 
All of these values are pulled directly from the log files and represent totals for 
that log file – a 24 hour period.  Additionally the IgnoreInstance attribute was 
added to support tuning efforts -- this column is used to exclude specific 
instances when importing data into WEKA, because it may be of value to ignore 
certain data while analyzing specific instances. 
6.4.2 Users 
The users table holds information regarding the individual users of the system.  
This table is populated by the WekaDBManagement script.  Whenever a record 
is added to the Instances table, the scripts looks to see if a corresponding user 
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exists.  If the a record doesn’t exist it will be added.  If a record does exist for 
this user, then the values will be updated. 
 
CREATE TABLE  `weka`.`users` ( 
  `User` varchar(20) NOT NULL, 
  `InstanceCount` int(11) DEFAULT '1', 
  `LoginsAvg` int(11) DEFAULT NULL, 
  `HoursAvg` int(11) DEFAULT NULL, 
  `LogOutsAvg` int(11) DEFAULT NULL, 
  `SuspendsAvg` int(11) DEFAULT NULL, 
  `ModulesUniqueAvg` int(11) DEFAULT NULL, 
  `ModulesTotalAvg` int(11) DEFAULT NULL, 
  `PatientsUniqueAvg` int(11) DEFAULT NULL, 
  `PatientsTotalAvg` int(11) DEFAULT NULL, 
  `APWWAvg` int(11) DEFAULT NULL, 
  `PrintModuleAvg` int(11) DEFAULT NULL, 
  `WorkstationUniqueAvg` int(11) DEFAULT NULL, 
  `Site` int(11) DEFAULT NULL, 
  `RoleAD` int(11) DEFAULT NULL, 
  `RoleID` int(11) DEFAULT NULL, 
  `Groups` varchar(3000) DEFAULT NULL, 
  `IgnoreUser` int(10) DEFAULT '0', 
  PRIMARY KEY (`User`)) 
 
Most of the data in a given record consists of aggregate data for the user across 
the entire range of logs.  This provides a view into the average number of logins 
(LoginsAvg) or the average number of print jobs (PrintModulesAvg) for the 
user.  This information is intended to show typical behavior for the user and will 
be useful when analyzing misclassified instances. 
 
Additionally there are a few columns that help identify the user’s role.  RoleAD 
is used to assign the user a role based on the information pulled from the 
organization’s Windows AD infrastructure22.  RoleID assigns the user a role 
based on information maintained in the application’s user table23.  Groups is a 
listing of all AD groups which the user account is included in.  As the 
organization uses AD groups to assign access to many resources, this 
information was captured to see if this might be a more accurate method of 
ascribing roles to users.   
 
Lastly there is a column that records the site which the user works at.  This was 
determined based on the workstations the user signed into.  If the user signed 
into workstations from multiple sites, a record was added to the event table. 
6.4.3 Events 
In addition to flagging when a user works at more than one site, the 
WekaDBManagement script looks for other data changes that might indicate 
unusual activity.  Specifically changes to RoleAD, RoleID, and Groups are also 
                                                 
22
 Mapping of AD to role can be found in FindUserComments subroutine of the PreProcess script. 
23
 Details on the application roles can be found in the RoleID Codes spreadsheet. 
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logged.  This was intended to show another view of the user’s activity that 
might be useful when analyzing misclassifications. 
 
CREATE TABLE  `weka`.`events` ( 
  `Type` varchar(45) NOT NULL, 
  `Description` varchar(3000) NOT NULL) 
 
Lastly it should be noted that no confidential patient data is held in the database.  
This data is captured in the original application logs but is removed by the 
Preprocess script.  Below is a data architecture diagram showing the various 
components described above. 
 
 
6.5 Classification System 
The WEKA24 data mining software package was used as a classification engine.  
This tool is a multipurpose machine learning engine that supports many types of 
classifications based on common ML algorithms. 
 
For the purposes of this exercise, a single classification algorithm was used.  
The J48 algorithm in WEKA produces a C4.5 decision tree.  This type of 
classification was chosen, not only because it is scalable to large datasets, it also 
produces output (i.e. decision tree) that can be easily understood by a user.  It is 
expected that by analyzing the decision tree, the user can make educated 
decisions regarding likely candidates (atypical behavior) for further 
investigation. 
 
                                                 
24
 http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/ 
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In some cases parameters were used to adjust the level of pruning associated 
with the decision tree.  The ‘confidence level’ parameter in J48 affects the tree 
size by setting the threshold for how confident the system should be in the 
decision.  The ‘minimum number of objects’ parameter controls the minimum 
number of objects that should be in a resulting leaf. 
 
WEKA will construct a decision tree which most accurately classifies the 
instances.  Once the tree is generated the system runs the original data set 
through the tree to determine accuracy.  There are several metrics produced that 
measure the accuracy but two are especially important for our purposes.  The 
overall accuracy shows how accurate the tree classified all users.  Additionally 
there is a separate accuracy rate for the users in a specific role.   
 
For example if a tree attempts to classify physicians and has an overall accuracy 
rate of 80%, that means that four out of five users (physicians and non-
physicians) were correctly classified.  Additionally the system’s ability to 
classify physicians might be 90%.  This says that if someone was a physician, 
the system would correctly classify them nine out of ten times25.  This was 
important in cases where the role in question represented a small number of the 
total user base.  
 
The third accuracy measurement is associated with a given leaf of a tree.  For 
each leaf, the accuracy is calculated for all instances that navigated to this 
particular node.   
                                                 
25
 Conversely a non-physician would be classified correctly with less than 80% accuracy. 
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7. Exercises 
The remainder of this paper will document various attempts at using the above 
described system to find atypical behavior, investigate it and determine if this 
behavior represent inappropriate activity.  The efforts documented below start 
with a description of each run.  This describes the starting data set and the initial 
classification run.  For example a run might attempt to analyze all nurses at site 
4.  Subsequent to each run is a series of investigations.  These are attempts to 
derive meaning from the results of the classification run.  So an investigation 
might attempt to determine why a certain number of nurses were incorrectly 
classified. 
7.1 Types of Investigations 
When reviewing the results of a given classification run, investigations are done 
in one of a few ways.  The first method uses ad-hoc analysis to find atypical 
behavior.  This is generally done by visual inspection looking for interesting 
nodes.  Attribute of a node that could trigger investigations includes 
classification accuracy (or inaccuracy) and the nature of the path (e.g. large 
number of unique patients). 
 
The second method of investigation incorporates consideration for the length of 
the path.  How does a node that is reached by a single decision compare to one 
that takes 8 decisions?  For these investigations, samples will be taken that 
represent short, medium and long path lengths.   
 
The third method attempts to make a more accurate tree by removing outlying 
instances.  This filtered-classification is done by running a normal initial 
classification run and then pulling out all misclassified instances.  After this the 
remaining dataset is reclassified.  The resulting decision tree is then analyzed by 
either ad-hoc or path-length investigation. 
 
It should be noted that in the investigation of misclassified instances, both false-
positive and false-negative classifications were reviewed.    The specific 
meanings of these cases are relative to the specific run.  In the case of 
classifying physicians, an example false-positive would be the case where a 
nurse acts like a physician, and an example false-negative would be the case 
where a physician does not act like his peers.  Either case can be troubling.  The 
first could indicate a snooping nurse while the second may indicate the doctor 
has shared his credentials.  Both are cases of inappropriate activity. 
7.2 Node Research 
Once it is decided that a node is to be investigated, two primary tools are used 
for research.  First the raw log files are pulled either by means of MCInfo.pl or 
by simple searching through the log files.  This will show specific detailed 
information.   
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The second method of researching nodes is by using SQL calls against the 
WEKA database.  This produces a simple high level view of the misclassified 
(or properly classified) instances.  Additionally this can give a view into the 
historical behavior of any users.  This is a valuable tool when determining 
whether or not atypical behavior (misclassified) is inappropriate activity.   
 
To show how historical information can help when investigating instances, 
consider the case of a misclassified nurse.  If Nurse Jones had a misclassified 
instance where in a 16 hours shift she looked at 100 unique patients, this in 
itself may be suspicious.  However it might be that in a typical day Nurse Jones 
looks at 50 unique patients.  Furthermore it might be that Nurse Jones’ typical 
shift is 8 hours, so this is in line with her typical historical behavior.  So in the 
case described above the higher-than-normal values might simply indicate that 
Nurse Jones has worked a double shift that day. 
7.3 Summary of Runs 
Below is a list of classification runs detailed in the next section.  For each run 
detailed output from WEKA and SQL are available in the supporting documents 
section. 
 
• Run 43 investigates pharmacists from site 0.  Ad-hoc investigations 
found two suspicious instances. 
• Run 38 classifies residents at site 4.  Ad-hoc investigations discovered 
several users with suspicious activity. 
• Run 46 combines residents and physicians at site 4 in a single 
classification group.  The path-length investigations produced four 
suspicious instances.   
• Run 47 considers physicians of site 6.  Several path-length investigation 
uncovered several cases of suspicious activity. 
• Run 42 investigates physician assistants from site 0.  The filtered-
classification investigations did produce one suspicious instance.   
• Run 48 investigates case-workers from site 2.  This also used the 
filtered-classification method, and flagged four suspicious instances. 
 
Note that the Weka files and spreadsheets associated with these runs are 
available in the supporting documents section. 
7.4 Run 43 
This run analyzes pharmacists from site 0.  It was selected to examine how the 
system would treat a smaller user group.  For this site pharmacists account for 
only 202 of the 9620 instances – 2.1%.  The following SQL code was used for 
the date import.   
 
SELECT logins, hours, logouts, suspends, modulesunique, modulestotal, 
patientstotal, patientsunique, apww, printmodule, workstationsunique,    
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if(rolead = 8, '1', '0') as class 
from instances, users 
where instances.user = users.user 
and site = 5 
 
Attribute filtering was attempted but was found to significantly reduce the 
accuracy.  As shown above, the entire set of attributes were used. 
 
The J48 classifier (with parameters of confidenceFactor of .05 and minNumObj 
of 5) was applied and produced an overall accuracy rate of 99.3%.  The 
classification accuracy of actual pharmacists was 79.9%.  The following tree 
was generated. 
 
 
7.4.1 Investigation 1  
Many instance followed the path to the node [0(8206/19)].  The system 
predicted these instances were of role 0 (not pharmacist).  Of the 8206 
instances, 19 were misclassified resulting in a high accurate rate of 99.7%.  
Note that there are only 13 pharmacists in the site and they accounted for only 
202 of the 9620 instances.  The following SQL call was used to display the 
misclassified users.  Notice that the SQL code directly maps out the path to the 
particular leaf. 
 
select * from instances i, users u 
where i.user = u.user 
and site = 5 
and modulesunique > 7 
and rolead = 8 
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The activity for the 19 pharmacists did not show any significant differences 
when compared to either the users’ typical behavior or to the typical behavior 
across all pharmacists. 
7.4.2 Investigation 2 
This node [1(130/3)] shows a group of instances that had a high accuracy rate 
(97.6%) and only three misclassified instances.  The following SQL call was 
used to display the misclassified users. 
 
select * from instances i, users u 
where i.user = u.user 
and site = 5 
and modulesunique = 7 
and patientsunique > 4 
and printmodules <= 0 
and rolead <> 8 
 
The three instances represent two users, one a physician and the other a Quality 
Outcomes Case Manager.  The activity for these three instances was not out of 
line based on the users’ previous behavior. 
7.4.3 Investigation 3 
This node [1(50/15)] shows a group of instances that had a lower accuracy rate 
(70%).  It was selected for investigation to see whether or not the nodes with 
lower accuracy rates produce better information than high accuracy nodes.  This 
node had 15 misclassified non-pharmacists.  The following SQL call was used 
to display the misclassified users. 
 
select * from instances i, users u 
where i.user = u.user 
and site = 5 
and modulesunique = 7 
and patientsunique <=4 
and suspends > 0 
and logouts <=2 
and printmodule <=0 
and rolead <> 8 
 
The following observations can be made regarding this node. 
• One user (afeokt01) had numbers that were much lower than his typical 
work day.  It was noted that this user’s shift was much shorter than 
normal that day.  
• One user (krobles) had three separate instances in this node.  One shift 
had one metric, ModulesTotal, much higher than normal even though his 
shift length was normal.  However this is not considered inappropriate 
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since the user did not have a rise in the number of ModulesUnique (i.e. 
he was working within his normal set of modules).   
7.5 Run 38 
This run analyzes residents (physicians in training) from site 4.  The following 
SQL code was used for the date import.   
 
SELECT hours, modulesunique, modulestotal, patientstotal, APWW, 
PrintModule, WorkstationsUnique,  
if(rolead = 2, '1', '0') as class 
from instances, users 
where instances.user = users.user 
and ignoreinstance = 0 
and ignoreuser = 0 
and site = 4 
 
The J48 classifier (with parameters of confidenceFactor of .05 and minNumObj 
of 5) produced an overall accuracy of 82.3% and a true positive classification of 
residents with an accuracy of 77.5%.  The following tree was produced. 
 
 
 
 
The question was then asked: what information can be gleaned from this result 
set.  Furthermore can this be used to detect inappropriate activity?  The activity 
associated with several leafs were investigated. 
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7.5.1 Investigation 1 
There is a leaf in the middle [0 (38.0/2.0)] where 38 instances ended up.  The 
system predicted that these users were  not residents (i.e. class 0).  The 
classification was accurate for 36 out of 38 instances (94.7%).  Using the 
following SQL code, the two users were identified.   
 
SELECT * FROM weka.instances i, weka.users u 
where modulesunique > 20 
and hours <= 3 
and patientstotal <= 20 
and site = 4 
and rolead = 2 
and i.user = u.user 
 
The mapping showed that these two residents did in fact act unusually as 
compared to their peers.  But did they act in ways inconsistent with their own 
historical usage patterns?  The results of the above SQL call allowed us to make 
the following observations. 
 
• User sjabsh01 had 50 recorded instances over the entire data set.  The 
misclassified instances were consistent with this historical behavior. 
• User pkarth01 had 29 recorded instances over the entire data set.  His 
usage across all metrics was considerably less than average including his 
number of hours.  This would indicate that this resident was acting 
normally, but just worked a shorted day.   
 
There appears to be no activity of concern in this leaf.   
7.5.2 Investigation 2 
There is another leaf in the middle [1 (14.0/3.0)] where 14 instances ended up.  
The system predicted that these users were residents (i.e. class 1).  The 
classification was accurate 11 out of 14 times (78.5%).   The following SQL call 
was used to show the misclassified instances. 
 
SELECT * FROM weka.instances i, weka.users u 
where modulesunique > 20 
and hours <= 3 
and patientstotal > 20 
and site = 4 
and rolead <> 2 
and i.user = u.user 
 
Activity from the 3 misclassified users was reviewed. 
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• User ccosta01 had 54 instances over the entire dataset.  The user’s 
activity was consistent with his historical patterns. 
• User agupta01 had 51 instances over the entire dataset.  The user’s 
activity was consistent with his historical patterns. 
• User mhyser01 had 37 instances over the entire data set.  While working 
an expected number of hours, this user saw considerably more patients 
and more modules than normal.   To further investigate this user, the 
following steps were taken. 
o Upon further review, it was determined that the user was 
misclassified and was actually a physician. 
o User’s activity for the day was pulled from the raw logs.  The 
activity which deviated from historical norms for that user was 
reviewed. 
o The number of unique modules, 27, substantially deviated from 
his historical activity.   Below is a breakdown of the user’s 
behavior over the entire dataset. 
ModulesUnique Count 
  5 14 
8 3 
9 4 
11 2 
12 13 
27 1 
o However the number of patients did not deviate.  Upon review of 
the unusual modules seen by this user, there is no evidence of 
suspicious activity.   Below is a listing of the modules viewed by 
this user. 
Typical Modules 
N Announcement - GE Muse 
N Announcement - Medication Orders 
Y Announcement - Patient Search 
N Announcement - Physician Search 
Y Announcement - Physicians 
Y Announcement - Results 
N Announcement - Transcriptions Alert 
Y CM MPI/Active Search 
N CM Patient Demographics 
N CM Staff Directory 
Y CM Station Census 
N CM Summary Viewer 
Y CM Working Patient List 
N GE Muse Web Results 
Y Login 
Y My Personal Notes 
Y My Web Page Links 
N OLR/RMC/SFH Clinical Documentation 
Y Patient Demographics with Images 
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N RES-Net Diagnosis and Procedure 
Y RES-Net Facesheets 
N RES-Net Insurance Notes 
Y RES-Net Laboratory and Radiology Results 
N RES-Net Meds Manager Meds Viewer 
N RES-Net Orders Selection 
N RES-Net Transcription 
N RMC/OLR/SFH DocView 
7.5.3 Investigation 3 
There is a node [0 (253/82))] where 82 residents were misclassified.  The 
system predicted that these users were not residents (i.e. class 0).  The 
classification had a relatively low accuracy rate of 36 out of 38 times (67.5%).   
 
SELECT * FROM weka.instances i, weka.users u 
where site = 4 
and rolead = 2 
and i.user = u.user 
and modulesunique > 13 
and modulesunique <= 20 
and hours <= 1 
 
The following observations were made regarding this node. 
• One user (mpongr01) was responsible for a misclassified instance where 
his patient and module count were higher than normal but his hours 
worked were much lower than normal.  The pattern of activity (access 
patient and then review demographics and test results) matches his 
historical behavior so this was not considered inappropriate. 
7.6 Run 46 
This run was selected to see whether or not the location of the node in the tree 
had any bearing on its usefulness.  The different runs produce trees of various 
depths.  What does it mean that a group of instances are grouped based on a 
single attribute?  What does it mean when a group of instances require nine 
decision points to be classified?  The following two runs will compare nodes at 
different path lengths (where a path length is the length of the path from the root 
of the tree to a node) to see if the number of decision points would help improve 
the usefulness of the tool for finding inappropriate behavior.   
 
This run analyzes physicians and residents (physicians in training) from site 4.  
The following SQL code was used for the date import.   
 
SELECT modulesunique,  patientstotal, APWW,  printmodule, 
if(rolead = 2, '1', if(rolead = 1, '1', '0')) as class 
from instances, users 
where instances.user = users.user 
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and site = 4 
 
This has a small number of attributes.  The original list of 14 attributes26 was 
filtered down to these three by means of WEKA's attribute filter function and 
parameters.  This filtering is the system’s guess at which attributes are most 
relevant for classification purposes. 
 
The J48 classifier (with parameters of confidenceFactor of .05 and minNumObj 
of 5) produced an overall accuracy of 87.1% and the true positive classification 
of physicians and residents with an accuracy of 98.2%.  The following tree was 
produced. 
 
 
7.6.1 Investigation 1 
The first investigation deals with nodes with short paths.  The node 
[1(4191/352)] classified role 1, physicians and residents, with an accuracy of 
91.7%.  The classification was based on a single criterion: PatientsTotal > 7.   
 
SELECT * from instances i, users u 
where i.user = u.user 
and site = 4 
and patientstotal > 7 
and rolead not in (1, 2)  
 
Of these 352 misclassified instances these observations were made. 
                                                 
26
 14 is the number of columns in the Instances table. 
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• User bstrock had a very large increase in the number of logins in this 
instance.  His average number of logins was 12 but this instance he 
logged in 70 times.  The hours are higher than normal (7 versus 4) but 
not enough to account for the large increase in logins.  Upon further 
investigation it was found that this user was part of the application 
support team and was testing the system’s single sign-on functionality. 
• User avadineanu had a large increase in both the number of 
PatientsUnique and PatientsTotal when compared to his historical 
activity.  Furthermore this user had a marked increase in the number of 
print jobs.  It was found that this user works for medical records and has 
similar work days about every 2 weeks.  This was considered normal 
activity for this user. 
7.6.2 Investigation 2 
This investigation deals with nodes with medium length paths.  The first node 
[0(19/2)])] classifies role 0, not physicians or residents, with an accuracy of 
89.5%.  The classification is based on four decisions: PatientsTotal <= 7, 
ModulesUnique > 10, ModulesUnique > 21, ModulesUnique > 24. 
 
SELECT * from instances i, users u 
where i.user = u.user 
and site = 4 
and patientstotal <= 7 
and modulesunique > 24 
and rolead in (1, 2) 
 
Of these 2 misclassified instances these observations were made. 
• Both users had a large increase in the number of ModulesTotal when 
compared to their historical behavior.  However there was a 
proportionally similar increase in the number of ModulesUnique.  
Furthermore there was no increase in either the number of patients or the 
number of hours.  These two physicians were likely investigating new 
capabilities or modules in the system. 
 
The second investigation of medium length paths involves node [1(162/1)])].  
This node classifies role 1 (i.e. physicians or residents) with an accuracy of 
99.4%.  The classification is based on five decisions: PatientsTotal <= 7, 
ModulesUnique <= 10, PatientsTotal > 1, ModulesUnique <= 5, 
ModulesUnique > 4.   
 
SELECt * from instances i, users u 
where i.user = u.user 
and site = 4 
and patientstotal > 1 
and modulesunique = 5 
and rolead not in (1, 2) 
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For the 1 misclassified instance these observation were made. 
• This user’s (jjohnson) activity is in line with his historical behavior.  
During investigation it was noticed that this user’s application RoleID 
indicated his role was that of a physician.  But the credentials used for 
classifying (RoleAD) were blank.  It is likely that this user was correctly 
classified by WEKA but simply mislabeled in RoleAD. 
7.6.3 Investigation 3 
This investigation deals with nodes with longer length paths.  The first node 
[1(127/41)])] classifies role 1, physicians and residents, with an accuracy of 
67.8%.  The classification is based on eight decisions: PatientsTotal <= 7, 
ModulesUnique <= 10, ModulesUnique > 5, PatientsTotal > 3, ModulesUnique 
> 8, ModulesUnique > 9, PrintModule <=2. 
 
SELECT * from instances i, users u 
where i.user = u.user 
and site = 4 
and rolead not in (1, 2) 
and patientstotal in (4, 5, 6, 7) 
and modulesunique = 10 
and printmodule <= 2 
 
Of these 41 misclassified instances these observations were made. 
• None of these instances showed any substantial change from the user’s 
historical patterns.   
• Additionally there were no values which registered as suspicious. 
 
The second investigation of longer length paths involves node [0(32/1)])].  This 
node classifies role 0 (i.e. not physicians or residents) with an accuracy of 
96.8%.  The classification is based on seven decisions: PatientsTotal <= 7, 
ModulesUnique <= 10, PatientsTotal <= 1, PatientsTotal <= 0, ModulesUnique 
> 2, ModulesUnique > 5, ModulesUnique > 6.    
 
SELECT * from instances i, users u 
where i.user = u.user 
and site = 4 
and rolead in (1, 2) 
and patientstotal <= 0 
and modulesunique = 6 
 
For the 1 misclassified instance these observation were made. 
• It was unexpected that the user was active in the system but accessed no 
users.  This was in line with his 4 other instances in the 60 day dataset so 
no further investigation is warranted. 
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7.7 Run 47 
Run 47 is the second case where nodes at different depths of the decision tree 
are compared.  This run analyzes physicians from site 6.  The following SQL 
code was used to populate WEKA for this run. 
 
SELECT modulesunique, patientsunique, APWW, PrintModule,    
if(rolead = 1, '1', '0') as class 
from instances, users 
where instances.user = users.user 
and site = 6 
 
This has a small number of attributes.  Filtering was done by manual inspection 
and testing to find a group of attributes that produced a high level of accuracy 
while creating a relatively small decision tree. 
 
The J48 classifier (with parameters of confidenceFactor of .05 and minNumObj 
of 5) produced an overall accuracy of 74.9% and the true positive classification 
of physicians with an accuracy of 95.0%.  The following tree was produced. 
 
 
7.7.1 Investigation 1 
The first investigation deals with nodes with short paths.  The node [1(22/3)] 
classifies role 1, physicians, with an accuracy of 85.7%.  The classification is 
based on three criteria: APWW <= 0, PrintModule > 7 and ModulesUnique > 
15.    
 
SELECT * from instances i, users u 
where i.user = u.user 
and site = 6 
and rolead <> 1 
and apww <= 0 
and printmodule > 7 
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and modulesunique > 15 
 
Of these 3 misclassified instances these observations were made. 
• Two users (ajoba01, adaggu01) had higher than normal counts for 
PatientsUnique and PatientsTotal.   
• These two users had higher than normal counts for ModulesTotal.  Their 
numbers for ModulesUnique were normal. 
• The hours worked for these two were higher than normal, which 
accounts for the above mentioned behavior. 
• There third user (bboncz01) had no substantial change to his typical 
behavior. 
• These three users are all physician residents.  It is not unexpected that 
their behavior would be similar to that of physicians. 
 
The second investigation was done to review with nodes with short paths.  The 
node [0(140/11)] classifies role 0, non-physicians, with an accuracy of 92.1%.  
The classification is based on three criteria: APWW <= 0, PrintModule > 7 and 
ModulesUnique <= 15.    
 
SELECT * from instances i, users u 
where i.user = u.user 
and site = 6 
and rolead = 1 
and apww <= 0 
and printmodule > 7 
and modulesunique <= 15 
 
Of these 11 misclassified instances only a single point stood out. 
• A user (mmoren01) had a large increase in his usual number of print 
jobs.  Upon review this physician had one day per month with a large 
number of print jobs.  This is likely due to his printing as a means of 
billing. 
7.7.2 Investigation 2 
This investigation deals with nodes with medium length paths.  The first node 
[0(104/10)])] classifies role 0, non-physicians, with an accuracy of 90.3%.  The 
classification is based on six decisions: APWW <= 0, PrintModule < = 7, 
ModulesUnique <=9, PatientsUnique <= 1, ModulesUnique <= 5, 
ModulesUnique <= 4. 
 
SELECT * from instances i, users u 
where i.user = u.user 
and site = 6 
and rolead = 1 
and apww <= 0 
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and printmodule <= 7 
and modulesunique <= 4 
and patientsunique <= 1 
 
Of the 10 misclassified instances these observations were made. 
• All 10 instances show physicians in a shorter than normal work day.   
• Some of these instances show physicians working with the system but 
not registering a single 100_ChangePatientContext event.  This is rare 
but not unexpected. 
 
The second investigation deals with nodes with medium length paths.  The first 
node [1(323/43)])] classifies role 1, physicians, with an accuracy of 86.6%.  The 
classification is based on six decisions: APWW <= 0, PrintModule < = 7, 
ModulesUnique <=9, PatientsUnique <= 1, ModulesUnique <= 5, 
ModulesUnique > 4. 
 
SELECT * from instances i, users u 
where i.user = u.user 
and site = 6 
and rolead <> 1 
and apww <= 0 
and printmodule <= 7 
and modulesunique =5 
and patientsunique <= 1 
 
Of the 43 misclassified instances these observations were made. 
• In general the decisions are limiting by nature.  That is the decision path 
tends towards small values (e.g. APWW >= 0, PatientsUnique <=1).  
Nothing in the misclassified instances indicates any inappropriate 
activity. 
• On average the total hours for the individuals is almost 1.5 hours less 
than each user’s average. 
• 28 instances are either residents (physicians in training) or are actual 
physicians that were mislabeled.   
7.7.3 Investigation 3 
This investigation deals with nodes with longer length paths.  The node 
[1(85/15)])] classifies role 1, physicians, with an accuracy of 82.3%.  The 
classification is based on eight decisions: APWW <= 0, PrintModule <= 7, 
ModulesUnique > 9, ModulesUnique > 10, ModulesUnique > 13, 
ModulesUnique <=22, PrintModule > 2 and PatientsUnique > 8. 
 
SELECT * from instances i, users u 
where i.user = u.user 
and site = 6 
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and rolead <> 1 
and apww <=  0 
and printmodule in (3, 4, 5, 6, 7) 
and modulesunique > 13 
and modulesunique <= 22 
and patientsunique > 8 
 
Of these 15 misclassified instances these observations were made. 
• All 15 of these instances were due to residents.  It is not unusual that 
these users act like physicians.   
• The individual instances are in line with historical average for each user.  
No inappropriate activity was found. 
 
The second investigation deals with nodes with longer length paths.  The first 
node [0(75/29)])] classifies role 0, non-physicians, with an accuracy of 82.3%.  
The classification is based on eight decisions: APWW <= 0, PrintModule <= 7, 
ModulesUnique > 9, ModulesUnique > 10, ModulesUnique > 13, 
ModulesUnique <=22, PrintModule > 2 and PatientsUnique <= 8. 
 
SELECT * from instances i, users u 
where i.user = u.user 
and site = 6 
and rolead = 1 
and apww <=  0 
and printmodule in (3, 4, 5, 6, 7) 
and modulesunique > 13 
and modulesunique <= 22 
and patientsunique <= 8 
 
Of these 29 misclassified instances these observations were made. 
• None of these instances are out of line with the user’s historical 
behavior.  These all appear to be non-malicious. 
7.8 Run 48 
 
The following two runs took a different approach.  It was asked what filtering 
can be done to make the model more accurate.  Can instances that are statistical 
outliers be ignored?  How much more effective would a decision tree be if it 
ignored those outliers? 
 
In the following two examples, two decision trees were built.  The first follows 
earlier examples.  Then another tree was built using only the correctly classified 
instances in the first tree.  Detailed investigations were then run on the resulting 
decision tree. 
 
This run analyzes case workers from site 2.  For this site case workers staff  
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account for 379 of the 9670 instances (3.9%).  The following SQL code was 
used for the date import.   
 
SELECT logins,  suspends, modulesunique, modulestotal, patientsunique, 
patientstotal, APWW, PrintModule, WorkstationsUnique,  
if(rolead = 13, '1', '0') as class 
from instances, users 
where instances.user = users.user 
and site = 2 
 
Attribute filtering was attempted, but was found to significantly reduce the 
accuracy.  The set of attributes used were found by trial and error to produce the 
highest accuracy while creating the smallest tree. 
 
The J48 classifier (with parameters of confidenceFactor of .05 and minNumObj 
of 5) was applied and produced an overall accuracy rate of 96.8%.  The 
classification accuracy of actual medical records staff was 47.0%.  The 
following tree was generated. 
 
 
To pull out instances that were misclassified, it was necessary to modify the 
ARFF file that was produced by the initial tuning exercise.  All instances that 
were misclassified in this run were then removed (303).  This included both 
case workers misclassified as non-case workers as well as non-case workers 
misclassified as case workers.  The data set was then reclassified by WEKA. 
 
The J48 classifier (with parameters of confidenceFactor of .05 and minNumObj 
of 5) was applied and produced an overall accuracy rate of 99.6%.  The 
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classification accuracy of case workers was 88.7 %.  The following tree was 
generated. 
 
7.8.1 Investigation 1 
Following the previous example, two nodes were examined at the top, middle, 
and bottom of the tree, respectively.  The first investigation for a short path was 
node [0(8561/1)].  This node contained a single case worker that was 
misclassified.   
 
SELECT * from instances i, users u 
where i.user = u.user 
and site = 2 
and rolead = 13 
and ignoreinstance = 0 
and apww <= 0 
and patientsunique > 0 
 
The following observations were made regarding this node. 
• The user (tdavis09) had higher than usual counts for most attributes.  
But the user also worked a day that was double a typical shift.  The 
numbers for this instance are reasonable considering the extended shift. 
7.8.2 Investigation 2 
This investigation examined paths of medium length.  The first node [0(11/2)] 
for consideration contained two case workers that were misclassified.   
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SELECT * from instances i, users u 
where i.user = u.user 
and site = 2 
and rolead = 13 
and ignoreinstance = 0 
and apww <= 0 
and patientsunique <= 0 
and modulestotal > 40 
and printmodule <= 3 
 
The following observations were made regarding this node. 
• The two users are in fact the same user (tdavis09) discussed above.  In 
these two cases the user had a much shorter shift than normal so the 
counts appear appropriate. 
• It should be noted that this user has a total of 24 instances in the data set.  
Of these, 21 were removed as part of the initial tuning.  The remaining 3 
were discussed in the previous two investigations. 
 
The second node for consideration [0(156/8)] contained 8 case workers that 
were misclassified.   
 
SELECT * from instances i, users u 
where i.user = u.user 
and site = 2 
and rolead = 13 
and ignoreinstance = 0 
and apww > 0 
and patientsunique <= 20 
and suspends <= 0 
and logins <= 10 
 
The following observations were made about this node. 
• Most of these users had noticeable changes in their typical behavior, but 
additionally had worked an atypical shift – either longer or shorter than 
normal.  There was no inappropriate activity found. 
• It was found that these users were tagged as case workers in the 
applications (i.e. RoleID) but were tagged as either nurses or medical 
records staff in Windows (i.e. RoleAD). 
 
 
The third node for consideration [0(32/3)] contained 3 case workers that were 
misclassified.   
 
SELECT * from instances i, users u 
where i.user = u.user 
and site = 2 
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and rolead = 13 
and ignoreinstance = 0 
and apww > 0 
and patientsunique <= 20 
and suspends > 0 
and workstationsunique > 1 
 
The following observations were made about this node. 
• Similar to the previous nodes, there was no sign of inappropriate activity 
in these instances. 
7.8.3 Investigation 3 
This investigation examined paths of longer length.  The first node [1(157/17)] 
for consideration contained 17 non-case workers that were misclassified.   
 
SELECT * from instances i, users u 
where i.user = u.user 
and site = 2 
and rolead <> 13 
and ignoreinstance = 0 
and apww > 0 
and patientsunique <= 17 
and suspends > 0 
and workstationsunique <=  1 
 
The following observations were made regarding this node. 
• Most of these users had noticeable changes in their typical behavior, but 
additionally had worked an atypical shift – either longer or shorter than 
normal.  There was no inappropriate activity found. 
• There were three users that accounted for 12 of the instances.   
 
The final node for consideration [1(6/1] contained a single non-case worker that 
was misclassified.   
 
SELECT * from instances i, users u 
where i.user = u.user 
and site = 2 
and rolead <> 13 
and ignoreinstance = 0 
and apww > 0 
and patientsunique in (18, 19, 20) 
and suspends > 0 
and workstationsunique <= 1 
and modulesunique > 14 
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The following observations were made about this node. 
• The user (lstopka) had higher than average counts for most attributes.   
• It is interesting to note that this user (lstopka) accounted for five of the 
17 misclassified instances in the first run of investigation 3 (immediately 
prior).   . 
7.9 Run 42 
This run analyzed physician assistants from site 0.  Note that this time, the role 
attribute was pulled from the application (RoleID) instead of from Windows 
(RoleAD).  For this site physician assistants accounted for only 7882 of the 
19295 instances.  The following SQL code was used for the date import.   
 
SELECT modulesunique, patientsunique, PrintModule, WorkstationsUnique,  
if(roleid = 402, '1', '0') as class  
from instances, users 
where instances.user = users.user 
and site = 0 
 
Attribute filtering was applied and resulted in the select statement shown above.  
Also this run did not use the typical J48 parameters.  The original runs produced 
very large trees with 191 leaves and a total size of 381.  To shrink down the 
tree, the J48 attribute governing the minimum number of objects per leaf was 
changed from 5 to 50.  This had a small negative impact on the overall accuracy 
(82.3% to 77.3%).  But the resulting tree was much more usable so this was 
considered acceptable. 
 
The J48 classifier (with parameters of confidenceFactor of .05 and minNumObj 
of 50) was applied and produced an overall accuracy rate of 77.3%.  The 
classification accuracy of actual physician assistants was 70.5%.  The following 
tree was generated. 
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All instances that were misclassified in this run were then removed (4,647).  
This included both physician assistants that were misclassified as non- 
physician assistants as well as non- physician assistants misclassified as 
physician assistants.  The data set was then reclassified by WEKA 
 
The J48 classifier (with parameters of confidenceFactor of .05 and minNumObj 
of 50) was applied and produced an overall accuracy rate of 98.6%.  The 
classification accuracy of actual physician assistants was 98.2%.  The following 
tree was generated 
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7.9.1 Investigation 1 
Following the previous example, two nodes were examined at the top, middle, 
and bottom of the tree, respectively.  The first investigation for a short path was 
node [1(162/11)].  This node contained 11 non-physician assistants that were 
misclassified.   
 
SELECT * from instances i, users u 
where i.user = u.user 
and site = 0 
and ignoreinstance = 0 
and roleid <> 402 
and printmodule <= 0 
and modulesunique > 31 
 
The following observations were made regarding this node. 
• Of these 11 instances, 10 were IS staff.   
• The one other misclassified instance was from a physician resident 
(lnuth01).  This user had a significantly more ModulesUnique (39) 
compared to his average (15).  During research, it was found that this 
discrepancy was due to the user testing the mobile version of the 
application that day. 
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The second short-path node investigated was node [1(55/27)].  This node 
misclassified 27 non-physician assistants.   
 
SELECT * from instances i, users u 
where i.user = u.user 
and site = 0 
and ignoreinstance = 0 
and roleid <> 402 
and printmodule > 8 
and workstationsunique > 2 
 
The following observations were made regarding this node. 
• The 14 users were responsible for the 27 instances.  Two individual had 
more than 4 misclassified instances in this node. 
• One physician (cgo01) had 14 print modules even though her historical 
average was 0.  These were facesheet reports and over a 10 minute 
period.  This was likely done for billing purposes. 
7.9.2 Investigation 2 
This investigation examined a node with average length paths.  The first 
investigation was node [1(263/8)].  This node misclassified 8 non-physician 
assistants.   
 
SELECT * from instances i, users u 
where i.user = u.user 
and site = 0 
and ignoreinstance = 0 
and roleid <> 402 
and printmodule <= 0 
and modulesunique = 4 
 
The following observations were made regarding this node. 
• One user (mhambl01) accounted for 4 of these instances.  In two 
instances most of his activity was less than normal including his hours.  
This user’s activity over the full data set shows a wide range of values 
for most attributes.  
• It is interesting to note that a previously discussed user (cgo01) has 
another instance in this node.  During the overall tuning, 7 of her 
instances were set to ignore – leaving 42 instances for this second pass. 
7.9.3 Investigation 3 
This investigation examined nodes with longer length paths.  The first node 
[1(148/3)] had 3 instances of non-physician assistants being misclassified.   
 
SELECT * from instances i, users u 
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where i.user = u.user 
and site = 0 
and ignoreinstance = 0 
and roleid <> 402 
and printmodule > 3 
and modulesunique > 14 
and workstationsunique <= 2 
and patientsunique > 5 
 
The following observations were made regarding this node. 
• Two of the misclassified users were physicians. 
• The other misclassified instance was due to a user (mthoma03) with a 
job description of data assistant.  This user’s activity is consistent with 
his historical behavior, aside from the fact that he printed 4 times when 
he averages 0.  The 4 modules printed had no patient information so this 
is not considered suspicious. 
 
The second node of longer paths was [0(355/21)].  This node contained 21 
misclassified physician assistants.   
 
SELECT * from instances i, users u 
where i.user = u.user 
and site = 0 
and ignoreinstance = 0 
and roleid = 402 
and printmodule in (1, 2, 3) 
and modulesunique in (10, 11) 
and workstationsunique <= 2 
 
The following observations were made regarding this node. 
• Activity for all 21 instances was at or below historical averages.   
• When looking at RoleAD (which tends to be more accurate), 10 of the 
misclassified users were physicians. 
7.9.4 Outliers 
This same run had been previously analyzed by means of a simple ad-hoc 
review.  There were two significantly atypical instances that were found by ad-
hoc review.  These are true outliers and were filtered by design.   
• A user (bblack01) printed modules 50 times while in his other 51 
instances he averaged 1 printer per day.  Similarly his patients total was 
91 for this instance but averaged less than 3 for the other days.  
• User (lbialka) viewed 93 unique modules in a single instance in which 
he worked only 1 hour.  The other two instances for this user, he 
averaged 11 unique modules.   This ended up to be a bug in the system 
where activity due to a single module was incorrectly logged.  However 
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with the data available this certainly constituted atypical behavior and 
ideally would have been reviewed. 
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8. Conclusion 
This paper described the design and use of a system that could be used in 
medical applications to help comply with the bevy of requirements that obligate 
them to look for inappropriate activity.   
 
By implementing machine learning methodologies, the system was successful at 
detecting atypical behavior.  It was able to accurately detect when a physician 
was not acting like a physician.  Conversely it successfully detected when a 
pharmacist was acting like a physician.   
 
Once the classification runs identified atypical instances, investigations were 
called out to those instances which were suspicious.  All three investigation 
types produced instances that were suspicious.  The ad-hoc method was the 
most fruitful.  This was likely due to the analyst’s intuitive review of the 
decision tree.   Conversely the filtered-classification was the least fruitful.   
 
Of the roughly two dozen suspicious instances, none were in fact inappropriate 
in our experiment.  Here are some examples of flagged instances that were 
suspicious but not inappropriate. 
 
• A physician printing out dozens of reports for billing purposes. 
• A user testing a new set of modules. 
• A user whose role was mislabeled in the application. 
• Users with very short or very long shifts 
• Many cases where a user's legitimate activity was truly erratic and 
atypical when compared to his peers. 
 
So the system successfully detected atypical behavior, and the investigations 
highlighted those atypical instances that were suspicious, but none of these 
turned out to be inappropriate.  Determination of appropriateness requires  
intense domain and context knowledge.  What were the events of day that led a 
nurse to look at a given record?  This is a question that cannot be answered by 
an automated system. 
 
Overall the system did successful parse 65,000 instances over 2 months and 
produced a list of 20 instances that were suspicious.  This is a massive reduction 
in work that would leave security analysts with a manageable amount of work 
while still meeting a reasonable level of auditing.   
 
8.1 Enhancements 
During the course of this exercise, the system provided many unique views into 
the users’ activity that had never been seen before.  In addition to looking for 
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inappropriate activity, this system may be used in various other ways, for 
example:  
 
1. It was noted that some doctors were using the system in way 
significantly different than their peers.  This was discussed with the 
application support staff and this will be reviewed to see if information 
can be used for training or efficiencies review of the doctors.  There is 
definite value to the organization to make physicians as efficient as 
possible. 
2. Can this model be applied to clinician performance review?  For 
example classification can be run comparing effective doctors and 
ineffective doctors27.  What can a comparison of their behaviors tell us?  
Does the number of times a physician access radiology reports have any 
bearing on the doctor’s overall effectiveness?  If the system were 
expanded to include other systems, it could consider the type of drugs 
prescribed, consultations made and nurses who interacted with the 
patient.  How do these values relate to the effectiveness of the 
physician? 
3. Can this model be applied to site performance review?  Similar to the 
clinician discussion above, what would a comparison of hospitals within 
a system show?  This could consider all sorts of inputs such as hours of 
mandated training, nurse satisfaction and dollars spent on health IT. 
4. Is it possible to tune the dataset over time?  For example if certain users 
are known to act significantly different from their peers (but still in an 
appropriate fashion), this user should be removed from consideration.  
Over the course of several iterations, pulling these safe but atypical users 
from the dataset may make a more accurate mapping.  
5. This system was able to detect when someone’s activity changed 
overtime.  What does it mean if the user’s average print jobs changes 
significantly?  It would be nice to analyze decision trees to see how a 
suspect user compares to his peers. 
6. Would combined filtering produce better results?  It was shown that 
filtered-classification produced some meaningful results but missed 
some suspicious outliers.  Running ad-hoc analysis followed by filtered-
classification would likely produce better results. 
 
 
 
                                                 
27
 There are numerous outcome measurements that could be used for this. 
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9. Appendix 
9.1 Supporting Documents  
Document Name Description 
PreProcess.pl PreProcess PERL script 
PreProcessOut.csv Output of PreProcess activities 
WekaDBManagement.pl WekaDBManagement PERL script 
RoleID Codes.XLS Listing of application IDs 
43.ARFF Output of WEKA for run 43 
38.ARFF Output of WEKA for run 38 
46.ARFF Output of WEKA for run 46 
47.ARFF Output of WEKA for run 47 
42.ARFF Output of WEKA for run 42 
42-Tuned.ARFF Output of WEKA for run 42 (after tuning) 
48.ARFF Output of WEKA for run 48 
48-Tuned.ARFF Output of WEKA for run 48 (after tuning) 
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9.2 Independent Study Application 
Summary 
 
Using various information classification methods, architect and prototype 
system that will automatically classify health care workers and then flag a 
worker when his activity is atypical to others in a similar role. 
 
Problem Statement  
 
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) requires 
health care entities to look for and deal with security incidents.  Unfortunately 
due to the complex nature of health care it is often difficult as well as 
impractical to enforce strict access controls to patient data.  Restricting a 
physician’s access to medical data could directly impact critical, time sensitive 
treatment.  But this limited control can be abused by health care workers to 
‘snoop’ or otherwise access private medical information inappropriately. 
 
This system will be able to detect when a member of a group (such as 
physicians, nurses, radiologists) acts different then his peers.  The intent is to 
provide health care providers a means of flagging atypical activity to satisfy the 
HIPAA requirements. 
 
Deliverable 
 
The deliverables will include: 
• System as described above with documentation 
• Documentation of practical management of such a system including 
tuning of alerts, time span for optimal analysis, and the management of 
‘false positives’ (i.e. incorrectly labeling activity as a negative event). 
• Report on effectiveness of the system based on multiple factors such as 
worker’s attributes (role, training, etc), organizational attributes 
(comparing different facilities, maturity of role definition within 
organization, etc) and various classification models 
 
Evaluation 
 
Evaluation of final product will be based on the following: 
• Capability to detect atypical activity within the system 
• Ability to tune system regarding false positives.  Specifically ability to 
filter out events that are incorrectly flagged as atypical. 
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• Comprehensive activity report allowing investigator to determine if 
atypical behavior is inappropriate.  That is, does this constitute a HIPAA 
violation? 
• Proposed model can be used with other medical applications 
 
